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phenomenon the Japanese-Tuesday effect. Tuesday-Tokyo trading follows Monday-New York trading with a lag of three hours, and based on this fact, Kato hypothesizes that there is a cause and effect relationship between the U.S.-Monday and Japanese-Tuesday effects. 2 Tokyo is thirteen hours ahead of New York, and trading sessions do not overlap.
Based on this fact, international asset pricing models predict spillover effects from New York to Tokyo exclusively in overnight returns (e.g., Stulz (1981) , Solnik (1983) , Cho, Eun and Senbet (1986) ). Spillover effects in trading-period returns violate the efficient markets paradigm. If a cause and effect relationship exists between the U.S.-Monday and Japanese-Tuesday effects, then theory predicts that the Japanese-Tuesday effect is a nontrading-period effect (the negative returns accrue over the Monday close to Tuesday open period in Tokyo). Puffer (1991) examines the impact of intermittent Saturday trading in Tokyo on return dynamics in New York. 3 The variance of New York stock returns measured from International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) on September 3, 1986 , and the impact of this event on the linkage from New York to Tokyo is examined.
We find that U.S. Monday holiday closures have a significant impact on Japanese return dynamics for the surrounding Friday, Monday, and Tuesday. However, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the U.S.-Monday and JapaneseTuesday effects are related. Potential explanations for the occurrence of the JapaneseTuesday effect and its recent disappearance are presented, and these explanations rely on microstructure properties unique to Tokyo. More interestingly, spillover effects from New York to Tokyo have become more pronounced recently, and this is attributed to the introduction in 1986 of Nikkei 225 futures on the SIMEX and the new strong dominance of the U.S. stock market in the world during the 1990's.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Sections II and III contain a discussion of the data set and research methodology, respectively. Section IV presents and discusses the empirical findings, and a summary and conclusions follow in Section V.
II. Data
Japanese equity returns are examined for a unique subset of trading days, the Becker, Finnerty and Tucker (1992) .
The data set is divided into two subperiods based on the existence versus nonexistence of NK 225 futures in order to isolate the impact of futures trading on Japanese stock return dynamics. The first subperiod covers the eleven-year period 1976 through 1986 and reflects the absence of index futures trading. The second subperiod covers the ten-year period 1987 through 1996 and reflects the possible impact of index futures trading. For expository purposes, the cut-off date for the first subperiod is December 31, 1986 and not September 2, 1986, but both dates yield similar empirical results.
III. Methodology
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is the first major market to begin trading each day as well as each week. April 28 through May 6, and most Japanese take extended trips during the Golden Week period. Hiraki and Maberly (1995) find that returns are unusually large throughout the Golden Week Period on pre-holidays, post-holidays and days in between.
To study the impact of U.S. Monday holiday closures on Japanese share prices, a robust regression methodology is used with lagged decomposition of daily returns. DOW effects are introduced into equation (1) Variations in the Monday, Tuesday and Friday DOW effects are introduced for U.S.
Monday holiday closures and Saturday trading.
The estimated model is given by:
In equation (1) one, and therefore the first lag is RCO t-0 rather than RCO t-1 . The reason is that overnight returns on day t represent the return from the prior day's closing to the current day's opening price. To capture the short-term dynamics of the return generating process, three lags are incorporated into equation (1) for each return series examined. 4 A more appropriate structure for intraday and daily returns is the use of the most recent intraday lagged returns in which some mild but significant correlation is expected due to various market microstructure or information reasons.
In equation (1) Thus, β o +β 1 +β 7 represents the average return for such a Monday with β 7 measuring the differences from a normal Monday before adjusting for the effect of lagged returns. The coefficients for Tuesday-and Friday-related dummy variables are constructed and interpreted in a similar fashion. The remaining variable G t is a dummy variable capturing the effects of the Golden Week group of holidays but is defined broadly to include not only pre-holidays but also post-holidays and days in between as well. It is obvious that the β 0 coefficient represents the average return for Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday before adjusting for the effect of lagged returns.
The equation (1) coefficients are estimated using a scale invariant M-estimator proposed by Huber (1964) . An M-estimator reduces the potential impact of outliers on parameter estimates by constructing the tails of the distribution inward. proposes a method of moments procedure to simultaneously estimate the model parameters of interest and the scale factor used to modify the distribution. Gallant uses the natural log of the hyperbolic cosine function, cosh(.5u) where u = ε/s represents the distribution of residuals (ε) normalized by the scale factor s. The moment equations are constructed by differentiating the function ln cosh(.5u) and integrating. Robust tstatistics are obtained with a spectral density kernel estimator of the covariance matrix with quadratic weights and analytical derivatives. Due to the dynamic relationships inherent in equation (1) 
IV. Empirical Results

A. Japanese Return Dynamics Conditional on U.S. Monday Holiday Closures
The empirical results are presented in Table 1 , panel A, for the sample period 1976 through 1996. Panels B (1976 through 1986) and C (1987 through 1996) correspond to the pre-and post-NK 225 index futures period, respectively.
Golden Week and Saturday Trading
The impact of Golden Week on returns is represented by the β 10 coefficient.
Returns during the Golden Week period are unusually large, and this phenomenon is interpreted predominately as a trading period effect. These results justify including a Golden Week variable in equation (1) . 
Monday holiday closures.
Bull versus Bear Market
From January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1989 , the TOPIX increased by eightythree percent, but by December 31, 1993, the TOPIX had declined by forty-five percent. respectively. Somewhat surprisingly, the β 1 coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.01 level for both bull and bear markets, and the sum β o +β 1 is negative in both instances.
Thus, the Japanese-Monday effect is observed over both subperiods. Evidence of the Japanese-Monday effect over the bull-market period is surprising. Since the sum β o +β 2 is positive for both bull and bear markets, there is no evidence of the Japanese-Tuesday effect for normal Tuesdays.
The Japanese return pattern for the Monday and Tuesday surrounding U.S.
Monday holiday closures is more interesting. Conditional on a Monday holiday closure in New York, Monday's TOPIX returns are larger than normal (the β 7 coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level), and the sum β o +β 1 +β 7 is positive for both bull and bear markets. Thus, in this instance, the Japanese-Monday effect disappears for both bull and bear markets. In contrast, conditional on a Monday holiday closure in New York, Tuesday's TOPIX returns over the bear-market period are lower than normal (the β 8 coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.01 level), and the sum β o +β 2 +β 8 is negative. A highly significant Japanese-Tuesday effect is observed over the bear-market period 1990 through 1993. 5 The selling pressure that was observed on normal Mondays shifts to Tuesdays whenever Tuesday follows a Monday holiday closure in New York.
In summary, conditional on a Monday holiday closure in New York, Monday and Tuesday's TOPIX return patterns for the bear-market period are consistent with arguments presented in this paper to explain causes of the Japanese-Tuesday effect, its subsequent disappearance, and the emergence of the Japanese-Monday effect.
B. Japanese-Tuesday Effect
Analysis of Tuesday Time Decomposed Returns
The first objective here is to verify the existence of the Japanese-Tuesday effect and to examine Tuesday's time decomposed returns. As noted previously, if world equity markets are efficient, then Tuesday's trading period TOPIX returns should be unaffected by information generated on Monday in New York. From equation (1), Tuesday's mean return, before adjusting for the effect of lagged returns, corresponds to β 0 +β 2 with β 2 measuring the average difference in returns between Tuesday and all other days, and these results are reported in Table 1 In summary, the Japanese-Tuesday effect is exclusively a trading-period phenomenon, but the negative Tuesday returns are confined to the first subperiod 1976 through 1986. These findings are inconsistent with the predictions of international asset pricing models and the hypothesis that the U.S.-Monday and Japanese-Tuesday effects are related.
U.S. Monday Holiday Closures and the Japanese-Tuesday Effect
This The empirical results for the first (1976 through 1986) and second (1987 through 1996) subperiods are reported in panels B and C, respectively. For the first subperiod 1976 through 1986, the β 8 coefficient is close to zero and not significant at a meaningful level for all three return measures examined, and this implies that there is no change in the Japanese-Tuesday effect in the absence of U.S. Monday trading. For the second subperiod 1987 through 1996, the β 8 coefficient is negative in sign and highly significant for all three return measures examined. For example, the β 8 coefficient corresponding to close-close returns equals -0.3997, and this implies that the Japanese-Tuesday effect is more pronounced in the absence of U.S. Monday trading. Thus, a highly significant Japanese-Tuesday effect is documented over the second subperiod in the absence of U.S.
Monday trading. This finding is interesting if not perplexing since the Japanese-Tuesday effect disappears for normal Tuesdays over the second subperiod.
In summary, the Japanese-Tuesday effect does not disappear in the absence of U.S. Monday trading but actually increases in intensity. The results reported in Table 1 do not support the hypothesis that the U.S.-Monday and Japanese-Tuesday effects are related, but they are consistent with those predicted by international asset pricing models and market efficiency. On the TSE, Monday is the day with the lowest trading volume and liquidity, and furthermore, transactions initiated by foreign investors are especially low on Mondays.
Potential Explanations for the Japanese-Tuesday Effect and Its Disappearance
However, by Tuesday foreign participation and total trading volume increases to more normal levels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Japanese financial markets are more transparent on Mondays and less transparent Tuesday through Friday. If a Japanese financial institution desires to hide selling activity from the Okurasho, then they will trade on days (or in markets) where transparency is low. Therefore, there is a tendency for Japanese financial institutions to initiate fewer sell transactions on Mondays, and to defer sell transactions to days when both foreign investors and discretionary liquidity traders are more active.
In Japan, regulatory prohibitions on stock lending make it hard to bet on share falls by short-selling borrowed shares in the hope of purchasing them for less and pocketing the difference. Short selling on the TSE is more difficult and costly than on the New York Stock Exchange, and a major impediment to short selling in Japan is the difficulty or even impossibility of borrowing stocks to sell short. Because of short-selling difficulties in Tokyo, good news is likely revealed faster in spot prices than bad news.
NK 225 futures were introduced in 1986 on the SIMEX, and there are no shortselling restrictions in the index futures market. This implies that bad news is revealed faster to the market after the introduction of index futures. Negative information is revealed first in index futures prices, and this information is conveyed rather quickly to spot market participants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. investors increased their participation in Japanese financial markets, especially on Mondays, after the introduction of NK 225 futures.
In this section, anecdotal evidence is presented suggesting that the level of selling pressure is greater on Tuesday in Tokyo than on other days-of-the-week and more selling pressure on Tuesday potentially is a cause of the Japanese-Tuesday effect. Associated with the introduction of NK 225 futures in 1986 and other factors, the Japanese-Tuesday effect disappears and the Japanese-Monday effect emerges that is exclusively a trading period effect. Some of the behavioral assumptions are conjectural, but in all cases, they are consistent with the personal observations of one co-author working as a financial consultant to Japanese financial institutions.
C. NK 225 Futures and the Linkage from New York to Tokyo
The existence of statistically significant spillover effects from New York to
Tokyo is well documented in the literature, but there is little evidence on the strength of this relationship over time. Puffer (1991, p. 421) Table 1 , we hypothesize that the influence of trading in New York on Tokyo has also increased over time.
Over This paper's empirical results suggest that day-of-the-week return patterns are dynamic and related to market microstructure. Since market microstructure itself is dynamic, seasonal patterns are subject to change without notice. Financial economists should be careful when making out-of-sample inferences from observed return regularities. : 1976-1996 B: 1976-1986 C: 1987-1996 R t = β 0 + β 1 M t + β 2 T t +β 3 
